Abstract-Competitive power control for energy efficiency maximization in wireless interference networks is addressed, for the scenarios in which the users' SINR can be expressed as either (a) γ = (αp)/(φp + ω), or (b) γ = (αp + βp 2 )/(φp + ω), with p the user's transmit power. The considered SINR expressions naturally arise in relay-assisted systems. The energy efficiency is measured in bit/Joule and is defined as the ratio of a proper function of the SINR, divided by the consumed power. Unlike most previous related works, in the definition of the consumed power, not only the transmit power, but also the circuit power needed to operate the devices is accounted for. A non-cooperative game theoretic approach is employed and distributed power control algorithms are proposed. For both SINR expressions (a) and (b), it is shown that the competitive power allocation problem always admits a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, for the SINR (a), the equilibrium is also shown to be unique and the best-response dynamic is guaranteed to converge to such unique equilibrium. For the two-user case, the efficient computation of the Pareto frontier of the considered game is addressed, and, for benchmarking purposes, a social optimum solution with fairness constraint is derived.
The first and most widely used definition of the EE has been the ratio between the throughput and the transmit power [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] , and references therein. Another proposed metric uses the goodput in place of the throughput [11] . In all of the above works, as far as the computation of the consumed power is concerned, only the transmit power is considered, whereas the power that is dissipated in the electronic circuitry of each terminal in order to keep the terminal active is neglected. This assumption has been relaxed in [12] , by defining the consumed power as the sum of the transmit power plus a constant term, independent of the transmit power, which models the circuit power needed to operate the terminal. Following [12] , in [13] [14] [15] the consumed power is also defined as the sum of the transmitted power and the circuit power. Moreover, in these papers the throughput is replaced by the achievable rate in the definition of the energy efficiency. In [14] , [15] a single user channel is considered and the optimization is carried out through transmit power control. Instead, in [13] , multiuser interference channels are considered and, as well as in references [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] , a competitive scenario in which the users selfishly aim at individual EE maximization is addressed. The resulting conflict situation is modeled and analyzed using non-cooperative game theory [16] , [17] , which has lately become a standard tool in the design of competitive resource allocation algorithms in communication systems [18] , [19] .
In all of the mentioned works, one-hop systems are considered. However, in order to support cell-edge users with highdata rate services under agile frequency reuse and improve the network's reliability and throughput, the use of relays has become a well-established strategy [20] , [21] . Relaying has proved useful also in the field of EE. In [22] , the optimal placement of relays in a one-dimensional cellular network is investigated and is seen to provide power-saving gains. In [23] , [24] instead, cooperative approaches aimed at weighted sum-power minimization with fairness and rate constraints are devised. The main difficulty when analyzing relay-assisted 1089-7798/13$31.00 c 2013 IEEE multiuser networks, is that the generic user's SINR, is not simply linear in the transmit power p, but rather admits more challenging, non-linear, expressions. In particular, the SINR is expressed as (a) γ = (αp)/(φp + ω), when a direct link between transmitters and final destinations is not available, or (b) γ = (αp + βp 2 )/(φp + ω), when a direct path is available. This clearly complicates the analysis, especially if a competitive rather than cooperative approach is considered. Competitive power control for EE maximization in relayassisted systems is addressed in [25] , wherein however, a simpler definition of the EE is considered, and the fractional-based EE is replaced by the difference between the achievable rate and the transmit power, scaled by a price. To the best of our knowledge, the first paper to use the more complex, fractionalbased definition of the EE in relay-assisted systems is [26] . There, a game-theoretic approach is employed to devise noncooperative power control algorithms for EE maximization in relay-assisted multiple access networks. However, neither the direct path, nor the circuit power dissipated to operate the devices are taken into account.
Motivated by this background, the issue of competitive power control for EE maximization in relay-assisted interference networks is considered in this work. Both SINR expressions (a) and (b) are considered, thus addressing both the cases with and without direct path. Moreover, the fractional-based definition of the EE is adopted, and the circuit power needed to operate the devices is accounted for in the definition of the consumed power, which adds an additional challenge. In this scenario, non-cooperative energy-efficient games are proposed and the following contributions are made: 1) For both SINR expressions (a) and (b), it is shown that the competitive energy-efficient power control problem always admits a Nash Equilibrium (NE). 2) For SINR (a), it is shown that the NE is also unique and that the best-response dynamics (BRD) of the game is guaranteed to converge to this NE. 3) A computationally efficient characterization of the Pareto-boundary of the considered game is provided for the two-user case, and a cooperative benchmark is also derived. The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system model is presented and the considered problem formulated. In Section III, EE with SINR (a) is addressed, thus considering the case in which no direct path is available. Moreover, the characterization of the Pareto-frontier of the game and the cooperative solution are also provided. In Section IV, EE with SINR (b) is considered, thus tackling the case in which the direct path is available. Numerical results are reported in Section V while concluding remarks are given in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT Let us consider, a synchronous, interference channel (IC) subject to flat fading, with K transmitter-receiver pairs, which communicate by means of an AF relay (Fig. 1) . We assume that the channel coefficients remain constant for longer than the time required for the resource allocation phase. We stress that we focus on a relay-assisted IC in order to fix ideas, but our derivations can be straightforwardly applied to general relay-assisted interference networks with a number of receivers different from the number of transmitters. Denote by p , b , d ,t , and h the -th user's transmit power, unitmodulus information symbol, distance from the relay, and slow-fading complex channel coefficient to the relay, modeled as a realization of a zero-mean Rayleigh-distributed random variable with variance d −2 ,t . In each symbol interval, the discrete-time model of the signal received by the relay is given by y r =
K =1
√ p h b + n r , wherein n r is the zero-mean thermal noise term with power σ 2 r . In order to avoid amplifier saturation at the relay, before being amplified, the received signal y r is normalized by the square root of its power P t , which can be computed as
where we have assumed that the noise is uncorrelated from the information symbols, and that information symbols from different users are uncorrelated with each other. After normalization, the received signal is amplified by the amplification factor a ≤ √ P r , with P r denoting the available power at the relay, and then forwarded to the destinations. In the following, let us consider separately the case in which no direct link between transmitters and receivers is available, and that in which such a link is available.
A. Relay-assisted interference channel without direct link
When no direct path is available, for all k = 1, . . . , K, the signal received at the k-th receiver is expressed as
n r + n k , wherein g k is the complex channel coefficient from the relay to the kth receiver, modeled as realization of a zero-mean Rayleighdistributed random variable with variance d
−2
,r , with d ,r being the distance between the relay and the k-th receiver, and n k is the zero-mean thermal noise at receiver k, with power σ 2 k . Consequently, the SINR achieved by the k-th communication link is
Plugging (1) into (2) and rearranging terms yields
. We remark that the considered system model applies to many relevant instances of communication systems. In the following we will provide two examples.
1) Multi-carrier, single-antenna relay-assisted interference channel: Consider a multi-carrier relay-assisted interference channel, with N available subcarriers. Letting n k be the k-th user's transmit subcarrier and w k the noise term at receiver k, the signal at the k-th receiver is given by
n r + w k , wherein ρ (n k ) denotes a binary variable which equals 1 if user is employing subcarrier k, and 0 otherwise, and
Then, the achieved SINR can be expressed as in (3) 
Consider a relay-assisted MIMO interference channel and denote by N T , N R , and N , the antennas deployed at each transmitter, receiver, and at the relay, respectively, and by q k , H k and G k the k-th user's beamforming vector, the matrix channel from the k-th transmitter to the relay, and from the relay to the k-th receiver, respectively. In this context, the relay amplification term will be the matrix A, with power constraint
Then, after linear multiuser detection at receiver k by the filter d k , the k-th user's SINR can be expressed as
which, plugging the expression of P t , yields (3), with
B. Relay-assisted interference channel with direct link.
As customary for AF relaying, we consider the scenario in which the signals on the direct and relay path are on two orthogonal channels 2 . Denoting by n d,k and c ,k the zero-mean thermal noise at receiver k due to the direct path, which has power σ 
h k,k . The 2 × 2 matrix to be inverted in γ k can be expressed as (5) on the next page. Computing the inverse of X k and elaborating we obtain
r , and elaborating, yields
with
C. Problem Formulation
The problem to be tackled is that in which each transmitter k is not only interested in maximizing his own performance in terms of achieved SINR γ k , but also in saving as much battery energy as possible. This trade-off is well modeled by defining the EE of a given terminal k, as the ratio between a so-called efficiency function which measures the SINR-based performance of user k and the power consumed to attain such performance level [12] [13] [14] [15] , namely
In (8), P c,k is the power that is required by the transmitter electronic circuitry to operate the device, and which is dissipated even during non-transmission periods. For further details on the circuitry power term, we refer the reader to [27] and references therein, where several power consumption models for wireless networks are developed. As for f (γ), in principle it can be a generic increasing function of the k-th user's SINR, with f (0) = 0 and such that (8) tends to zero for growing p k . Two widely used efficiency functions are
with R being the communication rate and (1 − e −γ k ) an approximation of the probability of correct symbol reception. A similar approximation has been used in [5] , [6] . Thus, f is the number of bits that are correctly demodulated at receiver k per unit of time.
2) f (γ k ) = W log(1 + γ k ), with W being the communication bandwidth. For strictly static channels f represents the k-th user's achievable rate. For quasi-static channels, 3 Note that ψ k is guaranteed to be positive because it holds
the use of f for resource allocation purposes is still wellmotivated in view of the assumption that the channel coefficients remain constant for longer than the resource allocation phase. Variations of the choice 1) are also available in the literature in the form
, and in this case the function f (·) is an approximation of the probability of error-free reception of a data packet of M symbols. An EE that considers both the case M > 1 and the circuit power P c,k has been considered in [12] for single-hop system. There, it was shown that an equilibrium for the power allocation algorithm always existed, but the convergence could not be proved. The techniques developed in this paper could be used to extend the results of [12] to the relay-assisted scenario, too. However, in the following we choose to focus on the equally well-motivated case M = 1. Indeed, for any M , the resulting EE (8) is a measure of the number of bits that are correctly decoded at the receiver, per unit of time and per Joule of energy drained from the battery of the transmitter. Moreover, all the efficiency functions that we consider result in an EE (8) which is measured in bits over Joule, thus representing a natural measure of the efficiency with which each Joule of energy drained from the battery is being used.
In the following, the problem of competitive power control for EE maximization will be considered. This competitive scenario is well-modeled as the non-cooperative game in
. . , K} is the set of players, while S k = [0; P max,k ] and u k = EE k are the k-th player's strategy set and utility function, respectively, with P max,k being the k-th user's maximum feasible transmit power. Mathematically, the game G can be expressed as the K coupled problems
Iteration (9) defines the BRD of G, the solution to its k-th problem is the best-response (BR) of player k to the other players' strategies
and each fixed point of (9) is an NE of G. In general, a noncooperative game might admit none, one, or several NE. Moreover, even if an NE exists, convergence of the BRD is not guaranteed. Before concluding this section, we should remark that the results to be derived in the following apply not only to relayassisted systems, but also to any system in which the SINR is expressed as in (3) or (7).
III. ENERGY-AWARE POWER CONTROL FOR RELAY-ASSISTED IC WITHOUT DIRECT PATH
Assume the direct path can be neglected. Then, the users' SINR can be expressed as in (3) . We start our analysis by deriving the k-th player's BR and proving that G always admits an NE.
Proposition 1: Consider the non-cooperative power control game G with γ k given by (3) , for all k = 1, . . . , K. Assume the efficiency function f (·) is a concave, increasing function of γ k such that lim u k = 0 for p k → 0, ∞. Then, for all k = 1, . . . , K, the k-th player's utility function, as a function of p k , has a unique stationary point 0 <p k < ∞, which coincides with its global maximizer and which is obtained as the unique solution of the equation
and, for all k = 1, . . . , K, the k-th player's BR is given by 
, agreeing with the results of [12] , where the circuit power is accounted for, but a SINR proportional to the transmit power is considered. Instead, if
agreeing with the results of [26] , [28] , [29] , where expression (3) is considered for the SINR, but the circuit power is not taken into account. There, it is shown that the BR for each player is to transmit at a target SINR, which does not depend on the other players' transmit powers. The other players' powers come into play only when each player k tunes his own power p k in order to reach the target SINR. This property allowed to derive a closed-form expression for the players' BR, which was then exploited to show that the best-response correspondence (BRC) of the power control game enjoyed the standard property 5 [30] , a key result to prove the uniqueness of the NE and the convergence of the BRD. However, when the circuit power is taken into account, equation (10) holds and the SINR achieved after the BR depends on the other players' transmit powers. This results in a much more implicit relation between the k-th player's BR and the other users' powers, which clearly makes the analysis more involved, especially when trying to show that G enjoys the standard property. Luckily, the following proposition proves such a result, together with the uniqueness of the NE and the convergence of the BRD.
Proposition 2:
Consider the non-cooperative game G and assume that the efficiency function f (γ) satisfies
Then, the best-response correspondence of G is a standard function. Moreover, G admits a unique NE and the BRD always converges to the unique NE.
Proof: See Appendix B. The next following corollary hold. (11) . Consequently, G admits a unique NE and the BRD always converges to the unique NE.
Multiplying both sides by e γ k and elaborating, we have
Multiplying both sides by (1 + γ k )
2 and elaborating, we have γ k ≥ log(1 + γ k ), which holds for any γ k ≥ 0.
A. Algorithms
In this section, the issue of the distributed implementation of the BRD is addressed and two algorithms are proposed. Both assume that the relay broadcasts to all players the constant amplification factor a, and that each player knows his own channels h k and g k . Instead, knowledge of the other players' channels and transmit powers is not required. Being an implementation of the BRD of G both algorithms are guaranteed to converge to the unique NE by virtue of Corollary  1 The first algorithm that we propose is based on the observation that in an interference channel, since each receiver is interested only in communicating with its intended transmitter, it is possible to identify, for all k = 1, . . . , K the k-th player not only as the k-th transmitter, but rather as the kth transmitter-receiver pair. Then, the computation of the BR can take place at the transmitter side of each pair, and then the result can be communicated to the corresponding transmitter side [13] , [31] [32] [33] , and references therein. Note that this only requires feedback information to be exchanged between each transmitter-receiver pair and not between a receiver and other transmitters. The advantage of this approach is that each receiver k is able to naturally measure the achieved SINR γ k and its noise power σ 2 k . Thus, α k and φ k can be immediately computed, and next ω k can be obtained by simply solving for ω k in (3). The formal algorithm is stated in Tab. I.
The second algorithm that we propose does not require the receivers to participate in the power allocation process, but makes two additional assumptions. First, we require that each transmitter k knows the noise power σ 2 k at its intended receiver, which is needed to compute φ k . Second, similarly to [8] , we assume that each transmitter can access a common reference signal, which, in our scenario, should convey the value P t . This can be implemented for example by having the relay measure and broadcast the value of the received power P t . Then, ω k can be computed as shown in Table II , where 
for Each user k do Access the broadcast signal P t and compute the quan-
, withp k given by Proposition 1. end for until Convergence is reached the algorithm is formally described. Each time a transmitter updates his transmit power, this results in a change of the received power P t measured by the relay, which will update the broadcast signal. Then, when another transmitter needs to update its own power, it will sense the reference signal and update p k accordingly.
B. Cooperative social welfare power allocation
In this section, following [6] , [8] , [10] , a joint, computationally simple, cooperative allocation for social welfare optimization is devised, which will serve as a benchmark for the efficiency at the NE of G. Two meaningful social welfare performance metrics are the average EE and the system global EE (GEE), respectively defined as [6] [7] [8] , [10] 
is neither a concave nor a quasi-concave vector problem. Moreover, due to the additive nature of EE av and GEE, the resulting power allocation policy might enforce too low transmit powers on users with very low channel coefficients. To circumvent these drawbacks, leveraging [6] , [8] , [10] , we impose the constraint of equal received power among users, which is equivalent to
Exploiting this constraint and elaborating, the k-th user's SINR becomes
where we have definedg = K k=1 1/|g k | 2 , and therefore we can recast the vector power allocation problem as a scalar maximization with respect to P . Accordingly, a social welfare power allocation with fairness constraint can be obtained by first finding the P * ∈ [0; P 
C. Pareto-boundary computation for the two-user case
This section is devoted to the computationally efficient characterization of the Pareto-boundary of G, for the case of a two-user system. It will be shown that, when K = 2, the Pareto-boundary computation problem can be reformulated as a pseudo-concave problem.
To begin with, let us express the first user's SINR as 
The solution of (13) yields the maximum utility achievable by user 1 if the utility of user 2 is set toū. Observe that the two extreme points of the Pareto-boundary are obtained when u = 0 and whenū =ū * , withū * being the maximum of EE 2 with respect to (p 1 , p 2 ). In the first case, since EE 1 is decreasing in p 2 , the solution to (13) is p 2 = 0 and p 1 the maximizer of EE 1 (p 1 , p 2 = 0). In the second case, noticing that EE 2 is a decreasing function of p 1 , we obtain that the only feasible point of (13) is obtained when p 1 = 0 and p 2 is set as the maximizer of EE 2 (p 1 = 0, p 2 ). Thus, the two extreme points of the Pareto-boundary correspond to the cases of single-user transmission. Next, let us focus on the casē u ∈ (0;ū * ). In this case the powers that solve (13) will both be strictly positive. This scenario is not trivial because Problem (13) is in general neither a concave nor a pseudo-concave problem. However, by using a transformation of variables, it is possible to equivalently recast it as a pseudo-concave problem. Applying the substitution p 2 p 1 t , Problem (13) can be recast 6 The constraint P ≤ P sw max is necessary to ensure that
≥ū,
Now, the following proposition holds. Proposition 3: For any concave and non-decreasing efficiency function f (·), Problem (14) is a pseudo-concave problem.
Proof: By definition, a problem is pseudo-concave if the objective function is pseudo-concave and if the constraint set is convex. Let us start with the objective function. Its numerator can be shown to be jointly concave with respect to (p 1 , t) as follows. First of all, defining the function c(t, p 1 ) = tp1 ϑ2p1+ω1t , the numerator of the objective function can be written as
Now, the eigenvalues of the Hessian of c(t, p 1 ) can be shown to be
thus implying that c(t, p 1 ) is a concave function. Then, recalling that f is non-decreasing and concave, and applying standard composition rules, it can be shown that (15) is concave. Then, since its denominator is clearly linear, the objective function is pseudo-concave. Next, focus on the constraints. The first two constraints are clearly linear, while the third constraint can be shown to be pseudo-concave by showing that it is the ratio of a concave over a linear function. To see the concavity of the numerator, let us rewrite it as
where we have defined the function d(p 1 ) = p1 ϑ1p1+ω2 . Then, note that (17) is the perspective function of the function f α2 φ2+1/d(p1) , which is concave because d(p 1 ) is clearly concave and f is non-decreasing and concave. Then, the concavity of the numerator follows by the fact that the perspective of a concave function is also concave. Finally, the thesis is obtained by recalling that a set of pseudo-concave constraints defines a convex set.
Proposition 3 ensures that we can efficiently solve Problem (14) by means of quasi-concave programming or employing Dinkelbach's algorithm [27] .
We end this section by mentioning that in one-hop systems, it is known that points on the Pareto-boundary can be achieved by means of pricing techniques [5] . Pricing techniques for relay-assisted systems have been considered in [25] . However, pricing algorithms require a centralized control unit that dictates the prices in order to achieve Paretoefficiency. Therefore, being the aim of this paper to devise non-cooperative algorithms for self-organizing networks, the study of pricing algorithms will not be undertaken here and is left as future work.
IV. ENERGY-AWARE POWER-CONTROL FOR RELAY-ASSISTED IC WITH DIRECT PATH
When a direct path is present, the users' SINR can be written as in (7), which, unlike the SINR expression (3), is not guaranteed to be a concave function of p k . Indeed, computing the second-order derivative of (7) with respect to p k yields
which is positive if β k ω k − α k φ k > 0. Consequently, also the efficiency function f is no longer guaranteed to be concave in p k , and thus Proposition 1 can not be straightforwardly extended to the case at hand. Therefore, in order to show the existence of an NE for G a different approach will be taken. We start with the following proposition. Then, the ratio g(
, with a, b positive coefficients, is strictly pseudo-concave.
Proof: Denote by x * the point below which f is strictly convex, and above which it is strictly concave. We will prove the result by separately showing that g is strictly pseudoconcave for x ≥ x * and strictly increasing for x < x * . This clearly implies strict pseudo-concavity of g for all x ≥ 0, since g is also differentiable in x * . For x ≥ x * , g is the ratio of a strictly concave function over a linear function, and therefore it is strictly pseudo-concave. Next, we have to show that for x < x * , g is strictly increasing. To see this let us compute the first derivative of g, which yields
Now, for x < x * , f is strictly convex, thus implying that (y − x) f (x) < f (y)−f (x), for all x, y < x * . Setting y = 0, we obtain the condition xf (x) > f(x), for all x < x * , which shows that (19) is strictly positive. Then, we have that for x < x * , g(x) is strictly increasing. Hence, the result. Propostion 4 allows to extend Proposition 1 to the case at hand, as shown next.
Corollary 2: Consider the non-cooperative power control game G, with players' SINRs given by (7), for all k = 1, . . . , K. Assume the efficiency function f is strictly Sshaped with respect to p k . Then, for all k = 1, . . . , K, the k-th player's BR is given by BR k = min(p k , P max,k ), with 0 <p k < ∞ being the unique global maximizer of the k-th player's utility function u k , obtained as the unique solution of equation (10) . Moreover, G is guaranteed to admit an NE.
Proof: For all k = 1, . . . , K, the first-order optimality condition for the generic utility function u k yields (10) . Uniqueness of the solution of (10) is guaranteed if u k is strictly pseudo-concave, which holds by virtue of Lemma 4. Then, the k-th player's BR follows by a similar argument as in Proposition 1. Finally, similarly to Proposition 1, the pseudo-concavity of u k , together with the facts that for all 7 An increasing, positive function is said to be strictly S-shaped if it is exists a point below which it is strictly convex, and a point above which it is strictly concave.
and S k is a compact set, ensure the existence of an NE for G.
The next two propositions ensure the existence of an NE for G when the canonical efficiency functions
, is a strictly S-shaped function of p k .
Proof: It is seen that, if (7) is strictly concave and therefore f can be shown to be a concave 8 function of p k following the same lines as in Proposition 1. Therefore, let us assume
It is seen that the left-hand-side (LHS) of (20) is a line with positive slope and intercept ω k , while the right-hand-side (RHS) is a quartic curve with intercept
Let us treat separately the cases
is strictly convex for p k <p k and strictly concave for p k >p k . This, together with the fact that
is strictly concave. Since we are in the case I k > ω k , (20) holds for any p k ≥ 0, if we can show that the coefficient of the linear term in the RHS is larger than φ k . The coefficient of the linear term of the RHS is given by
Next, note that the condition I k > ω k can be equivalently written as (22) is a decreasing function of ω k β k . Computing the minimum value we have 2(α k + 2φ k ), which is clearly larger than φ k . Thus, when I k > ω k , (22) is always larger than φ k . Hence the thesis.
and that in this range (22) is minimized when ω
Proof: Again, without loss of generality, assume
Computing the second-order derivative of the efficiency function with respect to p k , and elaborating, we obtain
8 Note that a concave function is particular case of an S-shaped function.
The RHS of (23) is the same quartic curve as in (20) with intercept I k given by (21) , while the LHS is a convex parabola with intercept ω k . First of all, we will show that the coefficient of the quadratic term of the RHS of (23) is larger than that of the parabola in the LHS. Elaborating, this is equivalent to the condition
which holds since all the coefficients are positive. Next, let us treat separately the cases I k ≤ ω k and I k > ω k . When I k > ω k , with a similar approach as in Proposition 5, it can be shown that the coefficient of the linear term of the RHS is lower-bounded by 2(α k +2φ k ), which is larger than the linear coefficient of the LHS, α k + φ k . This, coupled with the fact that the coefficient of the quadratic term of the RHS is larger than that of the LHS, implies that (23) holds for any p k ≥ 0 and hence that f (γ k (p k )) is strictly concave.
As for the case I k ≤ ω k , denote by RHS (p k ) and LHS (p k ) the first-order derivatives of the RHS and LHS of (23), respectively. Then, recalling that the coefficient of the quadratic term of the RHS is larger than that of the LHS, it is easy to realize that RHS (p k ) and LHS (p k ) either have a unique intersection point p *
In the former case, we have that the RHS of (23) grows more slowly than the LHS for p k < p * k and more rapidly for p k > p * k . Instead, in the latter case, the RHS of (23) grows more rapidly than the LHS for all p k > 0. Thus, in both cases it follows that the RHS and LHS of (23) have a unique intersection point, which in turn implies that the secondorder derivative of f (γ k (p k )) has a unique zero. Hence, with a similar argument as in Lemma 5, we can conclude that f (γ k (p k )) is a strictly S-shaped function.
In Tab. III a distributed algorithm for the implementation of the BRD is provided. In addition to the assumption of Algorithm I, Algorithm III also requires each receiver k to know his own direct-channel c k,k and to measure the covariance matrix of the received signal [31] [32] [33] , which can be expressed as
Next,
, while x 1,k and x 2,k can be expressed in terms of P t as x 1,k = (
Then, it also possible to express the coefficients ψ k and λ k that appear in (6) as a function of P t , which allows to solve for P t in (6), since the SINR γ k has been measured. Once P t is computed, the quantities x 1,k , x 2,k , ψ k , and λ k can be obtained, and hence α k , β k , φ k , and ω k . The steps of the algorithm are described in Tab. III. Compute the interference-plus-noise power on the direct path as
Measure the SINR γ k , express the coefficients x 1,k , x 2,k , ψ k , and λ k in terms of P t , as explained in Section IV. Then solve for P t in (6) . Use the obtained value of P t to compute the coefficients x 1,k and x 2,k , and then ψ k and λ k . Compute the coefficient In Fig. 2 the average EE achieved at the NE of the noncooperative power control game from Section III versus the number of active users is shown, for the efficiencies f (γ k ) = R(1 − e −γ k ), with R = 10 6 bit/s, and f (γ k ) = W log(1 + γ k ), with W = 1MHz. As a benchmark, the average EE of the cooperative approach with fairness constraint from Section III-B is reported. Moreover, the initial average EE resulting from a random power allocation, namely the EE before the resource allocation algorithms come into play, and a heuristic, one-shot, power control algorithm in which each user k sets the transmit power in order to maximize his own utility u k assuming that all other users are transmitting at half of the feasible power, have been reported. The results clearly indicate that despite the lack of cooperation among users, the proposed algorithms achieve a larger average EE than both the initial EE and the heuristic power control. Also, as expected, the cooperative approach exhibits better performance than the non-cooperative approach, indicating, in line with previous related works, that the lack of cooperation among the players causes the NE of the non-cooperative power control game to be inside the Pareto-region. In Fig. 3 a similar scenario as in Fig. 2 is addressed, with the difference that the GEE is shown instead of the average EE. Similar remarks as for Fig. 2 hold.
Next, we turn our attention on the transmit power that is required by the proposed approaches. In Fig. 4 , the average transmit power at the NE of the power control game and that resulting from cooperative average EE maximization are reported for both f (γ k ) = R(1 − e −γ k ) and f (γ k ) = W log(1 + γ k ). The results indicate that in both scenarios, the average transmit power is below the maximum feasible transmit power. Moreover, it is seen that two efficiency functions tend to result in an identical power consumption as the number of users increases, both with the non-cooperative and 
Number of iterations
Number of iterations cooperative approach. In Tab. IV the convergence speed of G is analyzed. In particular, the number of iterations required for the BRD to converge versus the number of users are reported for both f (γ k ) = R(1 − e −γ k ) and f (γ k ) = W log(1 + γ k ). The results indicate that the number of required iterations is quite low even for high network loads, thus making the practical implementation of the considered distributed power control game feasible in real world scenarios, too.
Finally, we consider the case of an AF interference channel with multiple-antenna terminals and relay, as described in Section II-A2, with N T = 2, N R = 4, and A = number of relay-antennas increases. It is also observed that the improvement reduces when N A is larger than N R , which is explained recalling that the multiplexing gain of each MIMO link between the relay and a given receiver is upper-bounded by N R .
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, competitive EE maximization in relay-assisted interference networks has been addressed, taking into account also the circuit power needed to operate the devices. First, the scenario in which a direct path between transmitters and receivers is not available has been considered. Next, the analysis has been extended to the scenario in which a direct path is available. A game-theoretic approach has been employed and, irrespective of the availability of the direct path, it has been shown that the considered competitive problem admits an NE. When the direct path is not available it has been shown that the NE is also unique and that the BRD converges to such NE. The efficiency of such NE has been benchmarked against a cooperative approach and a computationally efficient characterization of the Pareto-boundary is provided for the two-user case.
Among the possible extensions of this work, we mention the problem of jointly allocating other resources together with the transmit powers, such as receive and transmit filters in MIMO and CDMA systems, or subcarriers in multi-carrier systems. Other possible lines of research are the study of the scenario in which the relay is also interested in optimizing its own energy-efficiency, for example because it is operated by energy-harvesting techniques rather than being plugged to the electrical network, and, as already mentioned, the investigation of pricing techniques to devise algorithms capable of achieving Pareto-optimum points.
μ < ω k , because μ > 1. Then, recalling that g is a decreasing function of ω k , and an increasing function of p k , the p k that solves g p k , ω (μ) k μ = P c,k will be smaller than that which solves g(p k , ω k ) = P c,k . Instead, the second inequality follows because P c,k μ < P c,k and g is increasing in p k . Hence, the p k that solves g(p k , ω k ) = P c,k μ will be smaller than that which solves g(p k , ω k ) = P c,k .
Thus, the BRC of G is a standard function. Then, it is a well-known result of game theory that, if the BRC of a non-cooperative game is a standard function, and provided that an NE exists, then the NE is unique and the BRD is guaranteed to converge to the unique NE. Since we have shown in Proposition 1 that G always admits an NE, the final part of the thesis follows.
